In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no frictions ex post (i.e., after noncontractible investments have been sunk). In contrast, in transaction cost economics ex-post frictions play a central role. In this note, we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex-post moral hazard. As a consequence, central conclusions of the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory may be overturned. In particular, even though only party A has to make an investment decision, B-ownership can yield higher investment incentives. Moreover, ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship-specific (i.e., when they have no impact on the parties' disagreement payoffs).
Introduction
Why do some transactions take place within …rms, while other transactions take place in the market? The leading answer to this question in modern economic theory builds on the idea that contracts are incomplete, as formalized by Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart and Moore (1990) , and Hart (1995) in their seminal property rights approach. 1 When contracts are incomplete, ownership rights matter in future negotiations, because they determine what will happen in the case of disagreement. Anticipating the outcome of tomorrow's negotiations, a party that will be in a better bargaining position has stronger incentives to make non-contractible investments today.
A central conclusion of the theory is that if only party A has to make an investment decision, then ownership by party B cannot yield higher investment incentives than ownership by party A. Moreover, ownership matters only if investments have an in ‡uence on the parties'disagreement payo¤s.
Thus, if investments are fully relationship-speci…c (i.e., they are worthless when the parties do not collaborate), the ownership structure is irrelevant for the investment incentives.
The property rights theory has been criticized because there are no expost frictions, which play a central role in traditional transaction cost economics. Speci…cally, Williamson (2002, p. 188) has pointed out that the assumption that there are no ex-post frictions is "deeply problematic" and that it is the "most consequential di¤erence" (Williamson, 2000, p. 605) between the property rights theory and transaction cost economics.
In the present paper, we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by introducing an ex-post moral hazard problem.
It turns out that central conclusions of the property rights theory can be overturned. Ownership by a non-investing party can lead to higher invest-1 Indeed, according to Andrei Shleifer the "incomplete contracts approach represents perhaps the most in ‡uential advance in economic theory in the last thirty years"(see the back cover of Aghion et al., 2016) . ment incentives, and ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship-speci…c.
Related literature. While the present paper adds a moral hazard problem to the Grossman-Hart-Moore setup, other papers have added an adverse selection problem. For instance, in Schmitz (2006 Schmitz ( , 2017 a party learns private information about its disagreement payo¤ after the investment stage, while in Su (2017) there is asymmetric information at the outset already.
In the literature investigating contractual solutions to hold-up problems, Goltsman (2011) studies the role of asymmetric information, while Schmitz (2012) studies the role of moral hazard. These papers do not explore the implications of di¤erent ownership arrangements.
The present paper is complementary to Mori (2018) , who also combines the property rights theory with transaction cost economics. Mori (2018) studies an incomplete contracting setup with sequential investments in order to model a trade-o¤ between ex-ante investments and ex-post adaptations.
Moral hazard does not play a role in his model.
The source of the ex post frictions in our setup is a moral hazard problem with limited liability. 2 See Innes (1990) and Pitchford (1998) for early papers on moral hazard with limited liability. 3 In contrast to the present paper, in this literature complete contracting models are studied.
The model
There are two risk-neutral parties, A and B. For instance, party A might have the human capital to conduct research in the …eld of biotechnology, while party B might be a large pharmaceutical company. Following Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Tirole (1999) , suppose that party A has no wealth and is protected by limited liability. At date 0, an ownership structure o 2 fA; Bg is …xed. If o = A, then party A controls the relevant physical assets (non-integration). If o = B, then party B has control over the relevant assets (integration). Following the Grossman-Hart-Moore approach, the parties cannot yet write an incentive contract at date 0.
At date 1, party A invests e¤ort i 2 [0; 1] in basic research activities.
Party A's disutility of e¤ort is given by 1 2 i 2 . At date 2, the interim outcome ! 2 fL; Hg is realized, where the success probability is given by Prf! = Hjig = i. The interim outcome determines the expected revenue that can be generated if a marketable innovation will be developed.
At date 3, the ex-post stage is reached and the parties can negotiate a contract. At date 4, party A exerts e¤ort e 2 [0; 1] in order to develop a marketable innovation, where the disutility of e¤ort is given by 1 2 e 2 . At date 5, the …nal outcome 2 f0; 1g is realized, where the success probability is
When at date 3 the parties agree to collaborate, then the revenue that they can generate together at date 5 is given by R ! , where 0 < R L < R H < 1. When at date 3 the parties do not reach an agreement to collaborate, then in line with the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory, the parties'disagreement payo¤s depend on the ownership structure.
Suppose …rst that o = A (non-integration). In this case, the revenue that party A can generate without party B's collaboration at date 5 is given by r ! , where r H < R H and r L R L . Hence, when party A owns the relevant assets, it can commercialize the innovation without party B's human capital, but the revenues will be smaller. We suppose 0 r H r L < R H R L , so the investment i is relationship-speci…c; i.e., its e¤ect is larger when the two parties will collaborate. 4 In order to keep the exposition short, we will assume that r H 1 2 R H and r L 1 2 R L . 5 Since party B cannot commercialize 4 Note that if r H = r L , the investment i is fully relationship-speci…c, which means that it has no e¤ect outside of the relationship. the innovation without party A, party B's disagreement payo¤ is zero. Now suppose that o = B (integration). In this case, both parties' disagreement payo¤s are zero. Since party A does not have access to the relevant assets, it cannot commercialize the innovation on its own. Party B cannot make a positive pro…t, because the human capital of party A is indispensable.
Following the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, we assume that the parties are symmetrically informed at date 3. 6 In line with the Coase Theorem, the parties will always agree to collaborate, which is expost e¢ cient (since R ! r ! ). Nevertheless, the disagreement payo¤s (and hence the ownership structure) are important, because they determine the threatpoint in the date-3 negotiations. Speci…cally, we assume that at date 3, with probability 2 (0; 1) party A can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to party B, while otherwise party B can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to party A. 7
We will consider two di¤erent scenarios. In scenario I, party A's date-4 e¤ort e is veri…able; i.e., there is no ex-post moral hazard, as in the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. In scenario II, only the …nal outcome is veri…able, whereas party A's date-4 e¤ort e is a hidden action; i.e., there is an ex-post moral hazard problem.
The …rst-best solution. In a …rst-best world, the parties will always col- 
Next, consider non-integration (o = A). If the parties do not collaborate, at date 4 party A will exert e¤ort e(!) = arg max er ! 1 2 e 2 = r ! ; so its disagreement payo¤ is 1 2 r 2 ! . Recall that party B's disagreement payo¤ is zero. When party A can make the o¤er at date 3, it will o¤er to set e = e F B (!) and extract the expected date-3 total surplus 1 2 R 2 ! . When party B can make the o¤er, it will also propose e = e F B (!) and it will leave party A its disagreement payo¤ 1 2 r 2 ! . Hence, at date 1 party A will invest
The following result summarizes the main insights that follow in scenario I.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no ex-post moral hazard. (ii) If r H = r L , so the investment i is fully relationship-speci…c, ownership does not matter (i.e., i A = i B ).
These …ndings are in line with the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. In particular, since party A is the only party that has to make an investment decision, A-ownership leady to higher investment incentives than B-ownership, provided that the investment is not fully relationship-speci…c.
In the latter case, ownership does not matter.
Scenario II: Moral hazard
Now suppose the date-4 e¤ort e is a hidden action. Consider …rst integration (o = B), so both parties'disagreement payo¤s are zero. When party A can make the o¤er at date 3, it will propose a contract according to which at date 5 party A will get R ! , so party A will exert e¤ort e F B (!) = R ! and its expected date-3 payo¤ is 1 2 R 2 ! . When party B can make the o¤er, it will propose a contract which says that at date 5 party A will get a payment t 0 (and party B will get R ! t ). It is straightforward to verify that party B will set t 0 = 0 and t 1 < 1. Party A will then choose the e¤ort level that maximizes et 1 1 2 e 2 , so e = t 1 . Party B hence proposes a contract that maximizes t 1 (R ! t 1 ). Thus, t 1 = 1 2 R ! and party A's expected date-3 9 Note that our assumptions imply that r 2 H r 2 L = (r H r L )(r H +r L ) is strictly smaller than R 2
payo¤ is 1 8 R 2 ! . As a consequence, at date 1 party A will invest A) . Recall that if the parties do not collaborate, at date 4 party A will exert e¤ort e(!) = r ! , so at date 3 its disagreement payo¤ is 1 2 r 2 ! , while party B's disagreement payo¤ is zero. When party A can make the o¤er at date 3, it will extract the date-5 return R ! , so party A will choose e F B (!) = R ! and its expected date-3 payo¤ is 1 2 R 2 ! . Now suppose party B can make the o¤er. Party B will design a contract according to which at date 5 party A will get a payment t 0. It is again straightforward to check that party B will set t 0 = 0 and t 1 < 1.
Now consider non-integration (o =
Party A will accept the o¤er and exert e¤ort e = t 1 if 1 2 t 2 1 1 2 r 2 ! . Thus, party B maximizes t 1 (R ! t 1 ) subject to t 1 r ! . As a result t 1 = r ! , since r ! 1 2 R ! . 10 Therefore, at date 1 party A will choose the investment level 
, then the date-1 investment is strictly larger under o = B than under o = A. In particular, ownership matters even when the investment i is fully relationship-speci…c (r H = r L ).
Thus, in case (i) the conclusion is as in the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. Yet, in case (ii) it turns out that B-ownership yields higher investment incentives, even though only party A has to make an investment decision. The reason is that the expected rent that party A gets under Bownership in the case of ex-post moral hazard can be more responsive to party A's investment than party A's positive disagreement payo¤ under Aownership. In particular, B-ownership leads to higher investment incentives than A-ownership when the investment is fully relationship-speci…c; i.e., when the investment has an impact only on the collaboration surplus but not on the disagreement payo¤s.
Conclusion
In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no ex-post frictions. Yet, in transaction cost economics, ex-post frictions play a central role. In this short paper, we have introduced ex-post moral hazard into the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory. In contrast to the standard model, ownership by the non-investing party can yield higher investment incentives than ownership by the investing party. Moreover, even when the investments are fully relationship-speci…c, ownership matters for the incentives to invest.
